






ince Darwin introduced the notion of natural selection to 
account for speciation, a discomfort towards evolution-
ary theory has persisted. Over the past 150 years, the 
main focus of criticism has shifted from empirical con-
cerns—e.g., how could natural selection account for the apparent 
design in nature?—to questions more conceptual in character. It 
thus became fashionable to inquire whether natural selection 
could be stated in a non-trivial or causally relevant manner. In a 
recent expression of this trend, Jerry Fodor has challenged the 
idea that predictive power could be ascribed to natural selec-
tion.1 Arguing that concepts revolving around natural selection 
cannot be subsumed under any lawful generalization, Fodor con-
cludes that selection should at best be understood as a historical 
reconstruction of past selective events. Although Fodor distances 
himself from creationist fancies, and he does not dispute the bla-
tant evidence for evolutionary change, he is unwilling to grant 
Darwinism the full prize: for Fodor, there can be no theory of 
natural selection per se because selection does not constitute a 
natural kind. 
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I don’t think that Fodor’s position can be sustained. Though 
it may at times be extremely hard to predict the future outcome 
of natural selection due to the numerous ecological intricacies 
involved, I want to argue that predictions in connection with se-
lective phenomena are at least in principle possible. This will be-
come clearer after the notion of fitness as a relational property is 
spelled out. Combined with this thesis, I want to reinforce a dis-
positional interpretation of fitness from which Fodor seems to 
unwillingly distance himself. On this view, the predictive force 
of natural selection lies not in forecasting the outcome of individ-
ual selective events, but rather in probabilistic assumptions 
bound up with populational thinking. Fodor’s worries that selec-
tion might fail to refer to a natural kind will also vanish as soon 
as a one realizes that what is being selected for isn’t simply an 
individual phenotypic trait, but a bundle of interacting trait 
types against a fixed environment. Natural selection will thus 
turn out to be more than a historical account of the causal chain 
of events leading to a given evolutionary configuration. By 
stressing these points, I hope to show that natural selection’s 
original role as a predictive tool in evolutionary biology can be 
retained. 
 
II. Fodor’s attempted coup against Darwinism 
i. Selection for and counterfactual conditionals 
Fodor’s primary purpose in Against Darwinism is to check-
mate the Darwinian model of speciation by means of natural se-
lection. Whereas Fodor accepts “the central Darwinist theses of 
the common origin and mutability of species”,2 he is skeptical 
about natural selection’s capability to account for evolutionary 
change. The core of his criticism is filled with grudges against the 
concept of selection itself: if evolution is to be equated with 
“changes of the distribution of phenotypic traits in populations 
of organisms”,3 one should expect the notion of selection for phe-
notypic traits to be elucidated. But that is precisely what evolu-
tionary theory can provide, Fodor assures us. Drawing on exam-
ples from the philosophy of mind (in this case, the minds of 
frogs), Fodor invites us to think of intentional states as adapta-
Against Fodor 55 
tions—that is, as the product of selective processes. If a frog’s fly-
catching behavior is thought of as an adaptation, there seem to 
be good reasons to assume that this particular behavior was se-
lected for catching flies. How far one is justified in isolating an 
individual trait as the sole substrate on which natural selection 
operates is a question to be pursued below. Suffice it at this point 
to say that there is for Fodor a strong connection between the de-
velopment of an adaptive structure and the notion of selection 
for. Since mere selection cannot distinguish an intentional trait 
from other coextensive mental dispositions, Fodor’s intuition is 
that to explain the appearance of a frog’s fly-catching mechanism 
as a mechanism for snapping at flies one has to resort to the idea 
that there is something that is being selected for.  
A less misleading example will more accurately illustrate the 
case. Imagine a population of fruit flies under the selective pres-
sure of predators that have a higher chance of spotting them 
against the dark foliage if they are light-colored. Now suppose 
that the fly’s genes encoding a dark body color also occasion an 
arrhythmic locomotive activity, so that ebony fruit flies also dis-
play a more chaotic, somewhat flamboyant behavior. In this case, 
the complicating question of what frogs are snapping at when 
they snap at flies is avoided,4 though Fodor’s “disjunction prob-
lem” still holds: “[i]f you are selecting for Bs and Bs are Cs, it 
doesn’t follow (it needn’t be true) that you are selecting for Cs.”5 
Although it is clear that dark body color and arrhythmic locomo-
tive activity will be jointly selected, it seems right to say that ar-
rhythmic motion isn’t what is being selected for. The rather 
pressing point Fodor is making here is that mere selection 
doesn’t seem able to cope with coextensive traits. To account for 
body color in adaptive terms, the stronger notion of selection for 
body color (and not for arrhythmic behavior) has to be invoked.  
Put this way, Fodor’s argument can easily be read as what it 
is intended to be: a puzzle about counterfactual conditionals. 
Since in counterfactual worlds the property of being ebony need-
n’t coincide with arrhythmic locomotion (just like flies needn’t be 
black dots in other possible worlds), it is reasonable to suggest 
that if ebony fruit flies didn’t display arrhythmic locomotive ac-
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tivity, they would—in an environment where dark colors pre-
dominate—still be selected. Analogously, if any light-colored 
fruit flies happened to be defective in locomotive rhythm, they 
would presumably not be selected.  
 
ii. Laws of nature, ceteris paribus clauses and Fodor’s conclusion 
Trouble, however, sets in at this point. For how is the theory 
of natural selection to support such counterfactual conditionals? 
Fodor adumbrates two possible ways to do so. One might first 
take Darwin’s original analogy with artificial selection seriously 
and suppose that natural selection is operated by the hands of a 
mindful Nature. Like a pigeon fancier of Darwin’s time, who 
“adds [successive variations] up in a certain direction useful to 
him”,6 natural selection could be thought of as an intentional sys-
tem governed by Nature’s whim: “that what it selects for is 
whatever it has in mind in selecting.”7 Counterfactuals could 
thus be formulated according to whatever is, as Fodor puts it, in 
the mind of Mother Nature. If Nature aims at selecting ebony 
fruit flies because of their body color and not because of their ar-
rhythmic locomotion, then in a counterfactual world only those 
fruit flies that exhibit a dark color would be selected.  
Clearly, Fodor doesn’t entertain this possibility earnestly. In 
fact, as he points out, one of the main theoretical strengths of ad-
aptationism is that it “doesn’t require the attributions of agency”8 
to mechanisms operating behind natural phenomena. Moreover, 
if Nature voluntarily orchestrated selective processes, there 
would be the rather grave question (shamanic assurances to the 
contrary notwithstanding) of how to gain epistemic access into 
her mind. So the most natural way to go is to appeal to laws of 
selection.9 Fodor’s ensuing attempt is to try to think of a law re-
lating a certain phenotypic trait with selective advantage over 
another trait. That is, for such a nomic relation to hold there 
would have to be a trait F in virtue of which individuals carrying 
trait F compete successfully with individuals lacking F. In the 
case at hand, a law would be said to correlate ebony body color 
(F) with selective success (G) if ebony fruit flies are selected in 
virtue of their being ebony, such that: F → G.  
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Fodor rejects this proposal. For him, when it comes to natural 
selection, such “a generalization applies not to Fs per se, but only 
to Fs-in-such-and-such circumstances.”10 This is what Fodor 
dubs the “context-sensitivity” of a trait’s fitness. There is strong 
evidence suggesting that for Fodor his notion of a trait’s selective 
success and a trait’s fitness are interchangeable terms. In fact, 
Fodor suspects that the concept of a trait’s fitness isn’t less prob-
lematic, “since it’s massively context sensitive whether a certain 
phenotypic trait is conducive to a creature’s fitness.”11 So what 
Fodor seems to be hinting at is the intrinsic relation existing be-
tween a trait’s physical makeup and its environmental surround-
ings in yielding a fitness value. In fact, if a law of natural selec-
tion be expected to associate any given trait with a certain pro-
pensity to successfully compete with other traits, it would be ab-
surd to reduce the range of such a law to a small set of fortuitous 
phenomena. Likewise, it would be extremely ad hoc to postulate a 
multitude of local laws to account for every individual case of 
selective success.  
To make matters worse, Fodor emphasizes that the context-
sensitivity at issue shouldn’t be mistaken for a ceteris paribus 
clause. In the latter case, the general force of a law-like statement 
is “obscured by the effects of unsystematic, interacting varia-
bles.”12 There is, however, an underlying generalization believed 
to apply to all cases, other things being equal. To draw on a stock 
example, Newton’s law of universal gravitation expresses the 
relation between the gravitational force (F), the gravitational con-
stant (G) and two point masses (m1 and m2), F being inversely 
proportional to the squared distance (d2) between m1 and m2. A 
ceteris paribus clause ensures in this case that other variables are 
held constant, so that deviations to Newton’s formula are to be 
justified in a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, the general gist of Fodor’s assault on Darwinists 
amounts to pinpointing the difficulties bound up with the con-
text-sensitive nature of “being a trait that is selected for”. If selec-
tive success is indeed comparable to the notion of “getting rich”, 
as Fodor exhorts, there is no regular behavior to be captured by 
“any nomological generalizations about which traits win compe-
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titions with which others.”13 On Fodor’s view, adaptationist re-
search programs are consequently divested of any predictive 
power. Because there is for him no homogenous reality behind 
traits that are being selected for, evolutionary theory’s conceptu-
al apparatus can on Fodor’s view be reduced to reference-empty 
sets: for Fodor, the term “‘a trait that’s being selection for’ pretty 
plausibly doesn’t pick out a natural kind.”14 All that is left for 
evolutionary biologists is the task of articulating causally rele-
vant events that individually explain each adaptation, given 
that—unlike lawful generalizations—“historical narratives are 
about (causal) relations among [particular] events.”15 That is to 
say, evolutionary theories are better understood as fact-gathering 
narratives that in nothing resemble the projective character of the 
broader scientific enterprise.  
 
III. The case against Fodor 
i. Fitness’ context-sensitivity 
Immediate reactions triggered by Fodor’s caustic remarks on 
natural selection tended to focus on the role played by laws in 
adaptationist explanations. Both Godfrey-Smith (2008) and Den-
nett (2008) partially acquiesce to Fodor’s point and discourage 
the use of covering law models of explanation16 in evolutionary 
biology. Though less emphatically, Sober (2008) sometimes 
seems willing to accept less traditional models of explanation 
too.17 In what follows, I want to endorse the view that evolution-
ary theory’s predictive power can only be regained if some kind 
or other of lawful generalization is allowed for in evolutionary 
thinking. But before showing how this can be done, some clarifi-
cation is needed. First, Fodor isn’t justified in shifting the whole 
explanatory burden onto the concept of selection for. Adapta-
tions can and often are explained in terms of mere selection. That 
being said, Fodor’s notion of context-sensitivity will be carefully 
examined. After it is shown that the context-dependence of a 
trait’s fitness isn’t as harmful as Fodor believes, I want to draw 
attention to an objectionable conceptual confusion that Fodor 
seems to partake in.  
From the outset, Fodor commits himself to the idea that a 
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phenotypic trait thought to have evolved as an adaptation has to 
be identified with a trait that was selected for.18 Since two coex-
tensive traits will as a matter of fact be selected together, Fodor’s 
complaint is that an evolutionary “free rider” would hardly seem 
able to qualify as an adaptation. I think the point is moot. To ex-
plain the appearance of a given trait, both the phenomena of plei-
otropy and gene linkage might have to be taken into account.19 
Traits are often selected in bundles, be it either because they 
share a common genetic basis or because the genes encoding the 
relevant traits tend to be inherited together during meiosis. This 
is exemplified in the case of ebony fruit flies exhibiting anoma-
lous locomotive activity. In explaining the prevalence of arrhyth-
mic locomotion in a population of fruit flies, one might resort to 
the notion of selection of: locomotion-defective flies are frequently 
found in a certain type of environment because there is selection 
of fruit flies carrying the genes responsible for the expression of 
this trait. True, at times this will be only a partial explanation. 
One may want to inquire why precisely these flies were selected 
and not others. A more fine-grained explanation could involve a 
causal account of why these particular genes and not others are 
being selectively favored.20 Depicting a more detailed causal net-
work would then take us back to the question of what trait there 
is selective pressure for: in the hypothetic case sketched above, 
for ebony and not for locomotion-defective flies. But there is no 
reason to restrict adaptionist explanations solely to the latter 
kind. 
Nevertheless, Fodor is right in insisting on selection for traits 
if we want to look into the causal roots of selective phenomena. 
If Fodor has any hope of finding laws of selection, he is also right 
in resorting to the selection for traits for the following reason. It is 
generally assumed that properties (and not individual terms) are 
subject to lawful generalizations.21 There are, furthermore, strong 
arguments suggesting that organisms and species are better un-
derstood as historical entities—that is, not as types, but rather as 
tokens.22 So if individuals both at the organismic and specific lev-
els are spatiotemporally contiguous entities, defined by a com-
mon historical origin, there is forcefully no natural law in which 
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they could figure. Hence, for traits to be explained not as by-
products, but as genuine elements in the causal machinery of se-
lective processes, biological entities will have to be decomposed 
into properties or sets of properties that are thought to causally 
interact, producing adaptive responses.  
Crucial at this point is the question of what these phenotypic 
properties interact with. It is a mistake to suppose that an indi-
vidual’s trait interacts exclusively with other individuals’ traits, 
as if a sum of phenotypic traits occurring in the same population 
could alone give rise to the property that Fodor loosely calls 
“competing successfully with”.23 Rather, in order to state what 
property competes successfully with what other property, one 
has to specify the environmental background against which se-
lective competition is said to take place.24 It should be noted that 
‘environment’ is to be understood in this context in a broad 
sense, including both abiotic and biotic elements, but an organ-
ism’s own genetic makeup as well.  
Is this a premature surrender to Fodor’s criticism on the con-
text-sensitivity of a trait’s fitness? To a certain extent, yes: as 
Fodor poignantly notices, “the adaptivity of a trait depends on 
the ecology in which its bearer is embedded.”25 However, this 
inference isn’t an insurmountable obstacle. Of course, in each 
case the environmental variable will have to be held constant if 
any significant statement about a trait’s survival and reproduc-
tive viability is to be made. But this doesn’t prevent us from re-
lating a change in the trait’s overall frequency to a trait’s relative 
fitness where natural selection is at work: the greater a trait’s fit-
ness, the higher the chances of its spreading throughout next 
generations.26 Indeed, this is the force behind Darwin’s initial 
intuitions. If resources aren’t infinitely available, any heritable 
trait that favors an individual’s survival or reproductive rate will 
tend to be preserved, reappearing in the next generations.27 For 
this correlation to obtain, nothing intrinsically content-bound 
about the correlation has to be assumed.  
Complications are bound to arise if we expect—consistent 
with our previous assumption that the environmental back-
ground to a trait’s relative fitness also comprises interspecific fac-
Against Fodor 61 
tors—that natural selection will also affect the very environment 
in which it is operating. If natural selection occasions changes in 
a trait’s representation in the overall population, and if a trait’s 
relative frequency is part of the environmental settings to selec-
tive events, then a trait’s relative fitness will be doomed to per-
manent fluctuation. These considerations are an exacerbation of 
Fodor’s original concerns that “which traits are adaptive for 
which phenotypes depends very much on the context.”28 Yet, one 
needn’t succumb to the conundrum. By splitting a spatial-
temporally continuous environment into time-slices, Okasha 
(2008) rightfully maintains that one might still ideally refer to 
natural selection as “an optimizing process relative to a given envi-
ronmental state.”29 Thus, even if only in relation to a circum-
scribed environmental state, a trait’s fitness can be restored as a 
viable concept. If Okasha’s proposal is taken seriously, then dif-
ferent traits could be assessed against transitory stages in an en-
vironment’s development, in accordance to which different fit-
nesses will result.  
Despite empirical difficulties associated with the enterprise 
just outlined, this is good evidence that predictive function can at 
least in principle be ascribed to a trait’s fitness. That the same 
phenotypic constitution might acquire different fitnesses accord-
ing to different environmental states or that, conversely, physi-
cally distinct traits might take on similar fitness values needn’t 
disturb us. Pace Fodor, there is no reason to fear that “‘is selected 
for’ can’t be a projectible predicate.”30 Fodor worries that because 
a trait’s fitness is a compound property of an individual’s phy-
sique and the environmental setup it inhabits, nothing could be 
inferred from the observation that trait T1 is selected for in envi-
ronment E1. After all, trait T1 might not be selected for in environ-
ment E2 and a distinct trait T2 might turn out to be equally or 
even fitter than T1 in environment E1. So fitness values might in-
deed seem to float free from physical constraints, giving the im-
pression that they aren’t projectible. But all that is required for 
fitness values to be grounded on a physical basis is, arguably, a 
minimal degree of consistency: if a given trait be said to correlate 
with a certain fitness value, it is desirable that the same physical 
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configuration be consistently identified with the same fitness un-
der the same environmental conditions.31 And I see no reason to 
suspect that the concept of fitness cannot meet this requirement. 
To return to the example of fruit flies, we can assume that the 
ascription of a certain fitness value to ebony body color will re-
main constant as long as an environmental state is taken as a 
fixed point of reference. Hence, given an environmental frame-
work of reference, the same physical constitution will bring 
about a constant second-order property, such as fitness is 
thought to be, and the same fitness value will correctly be pro-
jected into cases where trait and environment similarly correlate. 
 
ii. Fodor’s improbable move 
So far, I have been implicitly assuming the standard disposi-
tional interpretation of fitness.32 Although Fodor is silent on this 
topic, some of the fundamental problems he wants to raise shall 
vanish as soon as a propensity reading of fitness is spelled out. 
Fodor seems inattentive, for example, to the fact that the outcome 
of “who wins a [trait] t1 versus [trait] t2 competition” isn’t only 
“massively context sensitive”,33 it also has to be stated in probabilis-
tic terms. No particular event of selective success could ever be 
taken as evidence that a given trait is being selected for.34 For 
similar reasons, I tend to disagree with Fodor’s pessimism about 
the causal role played by individual trait types. Skeptical about 
the explanatory power of “selection for”, as opposed to Sober’s 
(1984) notion of “selection of”, Fodor notes that “strictly speak-
ing, traits don’t get selected at all; traits don’t either win competi-
tions or lose them.”35 Fodor’s alternative solution is to consider 
whole phenotypes as causally relevant for natural selection. But 
for Fodor that won’t do: “[u]nlike a scientist in a laboratory, nat-
ural selection can’t control for confounding variables”,36 so to 
credit any specific trait with partial causal significance turns out 
to be prima facie impossible. However, Fodor is wrong in assum-
ing that what holds true for individual cases can also be predicat-
ed of phenotypic trait types obeying probabilistic rules. Moreo-
ver, the fact that Fodor is willing to grant scientists in a laborato-
ry the tools necessary for the task is indicative that we are deal-
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ing (pace Fodor) with empirical, not conceptual intricacies.37  
Related issues on the unit-of-selection problem support this 
diagnosis. To answer the question of whether causally relevant 
properties should be located at the particle or group level, there 
is no resource at the biologist’s hand other than controlling for 
variables: if individual fitness affects the differential reproduc-
tion at species level, but not properties at the particle level, then 
it is reasonable to suggest a causal link between group properties 
and selection.38 Analogously, a similar model should be expected 
to work in a less complex scenario where concurring properties 
are thought of in connection with one another at the same hierar-
chical level.  
The empirical complexities of evolutionary models tie in with 
a probabilistic reading of the concept of fitness for a further rea-
son. Once it is granted that fitness is conceptually dependent 
solely on a trait’s physical structure and the environmental back-
ground where it occurs, it is hard to see how a trait’s fitness 
could ever be promptly measured on the basis of actual repro-
ductive success. Rosenberg (1984) points out that if fitness values 
are defined by future rates of reproduction, there is no way to 
test the obtained result; but if fitness is defined by past reproduc-
tive rates, it would be plainly circular to use this concept in any 
explanatory move. So, it seems, the only viable solution to Ros-
enberg’s dilemma is to opt, on pains of empirical vacuity, for the 
latter mode of measuring fitness. However, as Rosenberg recalls, 
this doesn’t corrode the predictive utility of fitness. Since a trait’s 
reproductive advantage is correctly thought of as a partially he-
reditary characteristic, a trait’s fitness will be “nomologically 
connected to the number of [reproductive] opportunities at pre-
vious and future generations.”39 On the one hand, if fitness val-
ues are to perform any explanatory function, they cannot entirely 
forgo prognostic extrapolation; on the other hand, if fitness is to 
have a minimal amount of empirical relevance, it will have to 
partially rely on past reproductive rates. Thus, ascribing a nu-
meric value to a trait’s fitness is an empirically tricky enterprise 
in which a certain degree of projective thinking has to be al-
lowed.  
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With this in mind, Fodor’s conflation of the notions of “a trait 
which wins competitions with others” and “a trait’s relative fit-
ness”, which might initially have seemed harmless, should strike 
us as forced.40 While the former term designates the unique out-
come of a given selective process, the latter notion bears predic-
tive relevance. Though past and future selective trends may gen-
erally be related, as I hinted above, there are no good grounds to 
unjustifiably blur the conceptual boundaries between the two 
terms. The example of dramatic results brought about by cata-
clysmic events brings this to the fore. Once environmental tur-
moil radically reorganizes the tension between selective pres-
sures and adaptive responses, past reproductive and survival 
rates don’t need to coincide with or “nomologically connect to” 
present fitness values. What was once selected (say, increased 
body size)41 when predation was the main selective pressure at 
work may cease to be advantageous after the leading pressure 
shifts to harsh climatic conditions. That is, the fit between dino-
saurs’ average body size and the current selective scenario dur-
ing the Mesozoic period may explain why reptilian clades—
containing living beings like the ones selected—are overrepre-
sented in fossil records of a geological era like that.42 In contrast, 
the fact that increased body size was reproductively successful at 
the same time period simply chronicles the outcome of a unique 
selective battle witnessed by the Earth’s biosphere. That is, in the 
former case there is an “ontological ascent” from particulars to 
trait types; in the latter case, trait tokens are descriptively inserted 
in a causally structured whole.  
 If this is right, Fodor’s conclusion is only corroborated by his 
conflating the concepts of “a trait which wins competitions with 
others” and “a trait’s relative fitness”—concepts that should be 
kept apart. No selective prognostic can be based merely on what 
trait is being selected. In order to do that, one would also have to 
take into account a) that a trait is always selected relative to an 
environmental background and b) that a trait’s fitness (although 
correlated to the rate at which the trait is being selected for) rep-
resents no more than a probable cause for a certain selective out-
come. By doing so, one naturally shifts away from the idea that 
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this particular trait is being or was selected for towards a more 
general inference: given similar conditions, similar physical 
structures will yield similar rates of relative survival and repro-
ductive success. It is thus reasonable to project that, under preda-
tion and provided with abundant food supply, big mammals will 
display higher chances of survival and reproductive success than 
their smaller counterparts—just like reptiles did and like other 
beings under similar circumstances would.  
There is, furthermore, no need to suppose that predictive 
power automatically entails a deterministic relationship believed 
to hold between phenotype, environment and actual reproduc-
tive success. Once a propensity reading of fitness is adopted, the 
predictive utility of evolutionary theory can be sustained even if 
one rejects, as it is desirable, a deterministic reading of selective 
processes. One way of doing this is to identify natural selection 
with the notion of a stochastic mechanism: abdicating from the 
unbiased certainty with which Newtonian mechanics is able to 
predict the motion of mass points, evolutionary theory is better 
understood as a theory that relies on probabilistic thinking. I by-
pass here the controversy over causal and probabilistic interpre-
tations of natural selection. The point I want to make is that at 
some level or other probabilistic elements have to be assumed, 
which nonetheless doesn’t hinder us in using the theory of natu-
ral selection predictively. There is plenty of room for predictions, 
if we assume a probabilistic interpretation of natural selection, 
because “[t]he expected outcome is not generated by attending to 
the forces acting on the coins, but by taking into account the 
structure of the population being sampled.”43 In this case, a 
trait’s relative fitness represents a statistical property whose vari-
ation “predicts and explains changes in relative frequencies.”44 
Likewise, a causal interpretation of natural selection ensures that 
“evolutionary theory provides both source laws and conse-
quence laws for the various forces it describes.”45 On this read-
ing, weighing the forces at work in a given selective arena pro-
vides a reliable description of the underlying causal network, 
which will in turn enable predictions to be made. Be it because 
natural selection “is a mere consequence of a statistical property 
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of a population – its variation in fitness”,46 or because it 
“operates when a critical environmental factor causes one trait to 
be selectively favored over another trait”,47 in both cases Fodor’s 
thesis that the context dependence of a trait’s fitness undermines 
Darwinism’s predictive power doesn’t hold water. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In the foregoing pages I have sought to relativize Fodor’s 
claim that the theory of evolution by natural selection has no pre-
dictive power, endorsing at most post hoc explanations. One main 
reason for Fodor drawing this conclusion lies on his mistaken 
understanding of the context-sensitivity of a trait’s fitness. First, 
the fact that a trait’s fitness is better described as a relational 
property does no harm to the regularity thought to obtain in its 
promoting survival and reproductive success. Because a trait’s 
fitness is a value resulting from the interaction of both the consti-
tution of its bearer and the environmental which it inhabits, it 
doesn’t follow that trait types cannot be systematically allied 
with certain environments to yield constant fitness values. Alt-
hough the same trait may indeed exhibit distinct fitnesses in dif-
ferent environments, there is no reason to suppose that a trait’s 
fitness won’t be constant under fixed conditions.  
At this point, it is telling to notice Fodor’s second unwarrant-
ed move: a trait that is selectively successful needn’t be equated 
with the trait whose relative fitness peaks in a given environ-
ment, as Fodor seems to assume. Since a trait will prove repro-
ductively favorable only in the long run, Fodor’s insistence that 
the central explanatory notion in evolutionary theory is which 
trait “successfully competes” with other traits cannot be taken 
seriously. A trait may in fact compete successfully with other 
traits depending on various factors, but there is still an important 
sense in which a partial causal role can be ascribed to trait types. 
Thus, there is no reason to despoil selection of its predictive 
utility. Of course, how to measure the impact on a trait’s fitness 
will be empirically challenging. Since the only measurable varia-
bles are past survival and reproductive rates, some degree of 
projective approximation will be required, if a trait’s fitness is to 
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be interpreted as a propensity to leave copies in next generations. 
But empirical intricacies shouldn’t prevent biologists from mod-
eling approximate selective scenarios. By doing so, scientists in-
evitably engage in both predictive and explanatory activities. 
Although a minor objection to Fodor’s position, it should moreo-
ver be reminded that “selection for” isn’t the only explanatory 
concept to be used in evolutionary thinking. As the case of neu-
tral mutations, gene linkage and pleiotropy attest, the fixation of 
some traits can also be explained by chance events and by the 














1 There seems to be no consent on what Fodor (2008) is trying to 
get at. While Dennett (2008) and Sober (2008) make much of 
Fodor’s claim that “the theory of natural selection can’t explain 
the distribution of phenotypic traits in biological popula-
tions” (p.11), for Godfrey-Smith (2008) Fodor is dissatisfied with 
natural selection’s apparent failure to accord to traditional cover-
ing law models. I tend here to side with the latter, although I 
think he does little justice to the fact that Fodor eventually con-
cedes that historical explanations are “often perfectly OK” (p.16).  
2 Fodor (2008), p. 23. 
3 Fodor (2008), p. 1. 
4 Fodor’s (2008) license to state his doubts about Darwinism in 
mental terms is backed by the presupposition that a “mechanism 
that’s selected for catching flies is not ipso facto a mechanism 
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that’s selected for catching ambient black nuisances” (p. 3). I 
sidestep these issues because they will prove irrelevant for the 
present discussion. Moreover, I do not see how, in Fodor’s case, 
any accurate inference can be made about the mental content of a 
frog’s fly-catching mechanism. 
5 Fodor (2008), p. 4. 
6 Darwin (2009), p. 30. 
7 Fodor (2008), p. 6. 
8 Fodor (2008), p. 7. 
9 Noting that laws can support counterfactuals, Fodor (2008) sug-
gests that “that’s what makes laws different from mere true em-
pirical generalizations” (p. 8). Fodor is here implicitly drawing 
on Dretske (1977), the idea being that because laws hold between 
universals and not between individual terms, nomic relations “go 
beyond the set of things in this world that exemplify these proper-
ties and have these magnitudes” (p. 266).  
10 Fodor (2008), p. 9.  
11 Fodor (2008), p. 9.  
12 Fodor (2008), p. 9. 
13 Fodor (2008), p. 10. 
14 Fodor (2008), p. 11.  
15 Fodor (2008), p. 15. 
16 With an appeal for the use of models and mechanisms in scien-
tific explanations, Godfrey-Smith (2008) concludes that “there is 
no need for ‘laws of selection’ in Fodor’s sense, either as a basis 
for explanations or counterfactuals, so it does not matter that 
they do not exist” (p. 39). Less constructively, Dennett (2008) also 
criticizes Fodor’s “antique caricature of scientific practice, hark-
ing back to Hempel” (p. 27) as yet another expression of his self-
warranted “license to dichotomize”. But even if we adopt a view 
of scientific explanation based on models and mechanisms there 
seems to be no way of unconditionally avoiding law-like, regular 
behavior in explanations; cf. Machamer, Darden and Craver 
(2000) on mechanisms: “A mechanism is a series of activities of 
entities that bring about the finish of termination conditions in a 
regular way. These regularities are non-accidental and support 
counterfactuals to the extent that they describe activities” (p. 7).  
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17 Notwithstanding his extensive work on the lawfulness of natu-
ral selection, Sober (2008) surprisingly attests that biologists 
“don’t usually use the word ‘law’ to describe such generaliza-
tions as Fisher’s. Rather, they call them ‘models’” (p. 45). 
18 This is, in fact, Fodor’s (2008) first premise of his so-called 
“putative argument” that culminates with the conclusion that 
“the theory of natural selection can’t explain the distribution of 
phenotypic traits in biological populations” (p. 11). 
19 Sober (1984a), p. 101. 
20 Sober (2008), p. 47. 
21 Cf. Dretske’s (1977) view of laws as a matter of “ontological 
assent” (p. 263) already addressed above (p. 6, fn. 9). 
22 That organisms and species are not types is pointed by Hull 
(1978): “on the historical entity interpretation, similarity is a red 
herring. It is not the issue at all. What really matters is how many 
organisms are involved and how much the internal organization 
of the species involved is disrupted” (p. 348). 
23 Fodor (2008), p. 8. The property in question was represented 
by G in the reconstruction of Fodor’s argument I offered above 
(p. 6). 
24 Sober (2008), p. 45. 
25 Fodor (2008), p. 9. 
26 To keep Sober’s (1984a) mechanical analogy, I assume for pre-
sent purposes that no evolutionary forces other than natural se-
lection are at work. 
27 Darwin’s (2009) original insight is well captured by the follow-
ing passage: “Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, how-
ever slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any 
degree profitable to an individual of any species, in its infinitely 
complex relations to other organic beings and to external nature, 
will tend to the preservation of that individual, and will general-
ly be inherited by its offspring” (p. 61). Darwin is fully aware 
that a trait’s fitness can only be duly appreciated by inspection of 
“its infinitely complex relations to other organic beings and to 
external nature”.  
28 Fodor (2008), p. 21. 
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29 Okasha (2008), p. 346. Along the same lines, commenting on 
the view of natural selection as a hill-climbing exercise in which 
fitness values always increase, Okasha concludes that “natural 
selection does involve a kind of hill-climbing; it is just that the 
landscape is continually being re-configured as the population 
evolves” (p. 347). 
30 Fodor (2008), p. 18. 
31 This is Kim’s (1984) “consistency requirement” for weak super-
venience, which, “in essence, is the prescription ‘Treat like cases 
alike’ in ethical contexts” (p. 62). Though not originally formulat-
ed to describe the biological concept of fitness, I follow Rosen-
berg (1984) in using Kim’s terminological grid for this purpose.  
32 Mills and Beatty (1979). For simplicity’s sake, I may freely 
speak both of individuals’ and of types’ fitnesses as a disposition, 
though the simplification is not representative of the authors’ 
true intentions. While doing so I keep in mind that “a notion of 
fitness which refers to types […] is a derivative of individual fit-
ness propensities” (p. 272).  
33 Fodor (2008), p. 9. To reiterate: the context-sensitivity of a 
trait’s fitness is unproblematic because it expresses an essentially 
relational property. Why its relational nature should render the 
concept of fitness unproblematic is clarified by Moore’s (1960) 
observation that “[a] relational property entails some quality in 
the term, though no quality in the term entails the relational 
property” (p. 309). That is, there is by definition no way of ex-
hausting a relational property by inspecting one of its terms 
alone.  
34 As Dennett (2008) remarks, “Fodor’s quaint view of causation 
leads him to ignore the power of effects that depend on probabil-
ity – he views such phenomena as not properly causal at all” (p. 
28). 
35 Fodor (2008), p. 10. 
36 Fodor (2008), p. 10. 
37 More evidence that Fodor’s (2008) arguments do not under-
mine the theoretical cogency of causal-statistical models can be 
adduced from his remark that “the ‘method of differences’ is to 
find out whether it’s their being F that explains why Fs cause Gs 
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or whether it’s their having some other property that’s confound-
ed with their being F. One does this by examining situations in 
which, as far as one can tell, all the (relevant) ceteris paribus con-
ditions are satisfied. Typically such situations don’t occur out-
side the experimental laboratory”, (p. 10, fn. 19, last emphasis 
added). 
38 Elaborating on an example introduced by Eldredge and Gould, 
Okasha (2006) attributes the growth in body size among horses 
documented by fossil record to selective pressure acting on 
group properties: “If larger horse species are fitter than smaller 
ones, that is, are more likely to survive and speciate, this could 
explain the trend in the absence of any within-species selection 
for large size” (p. 110). 
39 Rosenberg (1984), p. 105. 
40 To keep Fodor’s (2008) example of dinosaurs, p. 10. See above 
p. 7. 
41 Once again Fodor (2008) gives up hope of finding any lawful 
correlation between a trait and selective success since to explain 
why “[s]mall mammals won their competition with large dino-
saurs” (p. 17) more than one plausible (causal) story can be told. 
Fodor’s example is problematic because of the fragile epistemic 
access to geo- and cosmological events that took place millions of 
years ago. I assume for present purposes that non-avian dino-
saurs were extinct due to a rapid change in climatic conditions. 
42 This reading of fitness as a causal concept is endorsed by Sober 
(1984b): “Fitness and selection are both causal concepts; they de-
scribe the causes of changes and not the fact that there has been 
differential productivity” (p. 204). An alternative to Sober’s con-
ception is presented below. 
43 Walsh, Lewens and Ariew (2002), p. 454. 
44 Walsh, Lewens and Ariew (2002), p. 462. 
45 Sober (1984), p. 70.  
46 Walsh, Lewens and Ariew (2002), p. 453. 
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